State-of-the-art posted-price mechanisms for submodular bidders with m items achieve approximation guarantees of O((log log m) 3 ) [AS19]. Their truthfulness, however, requires bidders to compute an NP-hard demand-query. Some computational complexity of this form is unavoidable, as it is NP-hard for truthful mechanisms to guarantee even an m 1/2−ε -approximation for any ε > 0 [DV16]. Together, these establish a stark distinction between computationally-efficient and communication-efficient truthful mechanisms.
Introduction
Combinatorial auctions have been at the forefront of Algorithmic Game Theory since its inception as a lens through which to study the relative power of algorithms for honest agents versus mechanisms for strategic agents. Specifically, there are n buyers with combinatorial valuations v 1 (·), . . . , v n (·) over subsets of m items, and the designer wishes to allocate the items so as to maximize the welfare, i v i (S i ) (where S i is the set allocated to bidder i). Without concern for computa-is that it is NP-hard for the buyer to pick their favorite set, so Set-For-Free is again not truthful (because the buyer picks a suboptimal set) or solving an NP-hard problem (because they find their favorite set). In fact, [SS08] establishes that it is NP-hard for truthful mechanisms to achieve a m 1/2−ε -approximation for any ε > 0. Algorithmically, a poly-time e/(e − 1)-approximation is known [NWF78] , providing again a strong separation.
We ask instead: what should one reasonably expect to happen if a strategic buyer participated in Set-For-Free? Consider the set S output by the poly-time algorithm of [NWF78] . It is certainly reasonable for the buyer to select some set T = S: perhaps a different heuristic finds a better set. But it seems irrational for the buyer to select some set T with v(T ) < v(S). We therefore pose that there should be some reasonable solution concept under which Set-For-Free guarantees an e/(e − 1)-approximation. Indeed, Set-For-Free guarantees an e/(e − 1)-approximation under our proposed "implementation in advised strategies."
Formally, we will think of Set-For-Free as simply asking the buyer to report a set of size at most k, and then awarding them that set for free. In addition, the designer provides advice: a Turing machine A(·, ·) which takes as input the buyer's valuation v(·) (possibly as a circuit/Turing machine itself, or accessing it via value queries) and a tentative set T , then recommends a set S to purchase that is at least as good as T . Specifically in Set-For-Free, we will think of the advice as running the [NWF78] approximation algorithm to get a set S ′ and outputting S := arg max{v(T ), v(S ′ )}. We say that a bidder follows advice if they select a set S with A(v, S) = S. The idea is that it seems irrational for the buyer to select a set without this property, when the advice gives a poly-time algorithm to improve it.
For a general mechanism, we think of advice as a Turing machine which takes as input the current state of the mechanism, the buyer's valuation, and a tentative action, then advises an (maybe the same, maybe different) action to take. Importantly, we say that advice is useful if for all strategies s, either the advice maps s to itself, or to another strategy which dominates it (see Section 2 for full definition). Intuitively, this suggests that it is irrational for a buyer to use a strategy which advice does not map to itself. We postpone to Section 2 a formal definition of what it means to follow advice, but note here that our definition is a natural relaxation of dominant strategies: if a mechanism has a dominant strategy s, then the only strategy which follows advice that recommends s is s itself. We say that mechanism guarantees a poly-time α-approximation in implementation in advised strategies whenever the mechanism itself concludes in poly-time, and there exists poly-time advice A such that an α-approximation is guaranteed whenever all bidders follow advice A. Again, note that the assumption on bidder behavior is quite permissive: they need not play a dominant, or even undominated strategy. We just assume they do not play a strategy which the advice itself dominates.
Advice via Approximate Demand Queries. We now revisit posted-price mechanisms, which achieve approximation guarantees of O((log log m) 3 ), but whose truthfulness requires buyers to compute NP-hard demand queries. Instead, we pursue guarantees in implementation in advised strategies. For a posted-price mechanism with price vector p, our proposed advice will take as input a tentative set T for purchase, and the buyer's valuation v(·), and recommend a set S guaranteeing v(S) − p(S) ≥ v(T ) − p(T ). 2 More specifically, our advice will compute a tentative recommendation S ′ independently of T , then simply recommend arg max{v(S ′ )−p(S), v(T )−p(T )}. Again, our behavioral assumption does not assume that the buyer will purchase the set S ′ tentatively recommended, just that they will not irrationally ignore the advice in favor of a lower-utility set.
The remaining challenge is now to find concrete advice under which the [AS19] approximation guarantees are maintained. A first natural attempt is simply an approximate demand oracle: have a tentative recommendation S ′ with v(S ′ ) − p(S ′ ) ≥ c · max T {v(T ) − j∈T p j }. Unfortunately, even this is NP-hard for any c = Ω(1/m 1−ε ) (for any ε > 0) [FJ14] . Instead, we design bicriterion approximate demand oracles. Specifically, for some c, d < 1, a (c, d)-approximate demand oracle produces a set S ′ satisfying v(S ′ )−p(S ′ ) ≥ c·max T {v(T )−p(T )/d}. That is, the guaranteed utility is at least an c-fraction of the optimum if all prices were increased by a factor of 1/d. We design a simple greedy (1/2, 1/2)-approximation in poly-time (based on [LLN01] ), and further establish that the [AS19] mechanism maintains its approximation guarantee up to an additional min{c, d} factor when bidders follow advice provided in this manner by a (c, d)-approximate demand oracle. This allows us to conclude the main result of this paper:
Theorem 1.1. There exists a poly-time mechanism which achieves an O((log log m) 3 )-approximation to the optimal welfare for any number of submodular buyers in implementation in advised strategies.
Roadmap
Combinatorial auctions have a long history within AGT, along with related problems like Combinatorial Public Projects. The most related work is overviewed in Section 1, but we provide additional context in Section 1.2. Section 2 contains a formal definition of implementation in advised strategies, repeating our motivating examples and providing additional discussion.
In Section 3, we design our poly-time (1/2, 1/2)-approximate demand oracles for submodular valuations. The proof is fairly simple, but we include the complete proof in the body for readers unfamiliar with [LLN01] (readers familiar with [LLN01] will find the outline simliar).
In Section 4, we establish that existing posted-price mechanisms maintain their approximation guarantees as long as buyers follow advice given by (Ω(1), Ω(1))-approximate demand oracles. We include a complete analysis of the main lemma of [FGL15] concerning "fixed price auctions" for readers unfamiliar with this aspect (readers familiar with [FGL15] will find the outline similar). We defer all aspects of the analysis of [AS19] to Appendix B.
Finally, in Section 5, we design simple poly-time ( 1 √ m , 1 1+ √ m )-approximate demand oracles for subadditive valuations. This is essentially the best possible even for XOS valuations, 3 due to known lower bounds on welfare-maximization with value queries [DNS10] and the results of Section 4.
Discussion and Related Work
There is a vast literature studying combinatorial auctions, which we will not attempt to overview in its entirety here. We summarize the lines of work most relevant to ours below.
VCG-based Mechanisms. The Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism provides a poly-time/polycommunication black-box reduction from precise welfare maximization with a truthful mechanism to precise welfare maximization with an algorithm for any class of valuation functions [Vic61, Cla71, Gro73] . The same reduction applies for "maximal-in-range" approximation algorithms, but this approach provably cannot achieve sub-polynomial approximations in poly-time (unless P = NP) or subexponential communication [BSS10, BDF + 10, DSS15]. Still, in some regimes (e.g. arbitrary monotone valuations with poly-time/poly-communication, or XOS valuations with poly-time), no better than a Θ( √ m)-approximation is achievable even with honest players, and a Θ( √ m)-approximation is achievable via truthful VCG-based mechanisms [LS05, DNS10] .
Combinatorial Auctions in the Computational Model. Taking the above discussion into account, valuation function classes above XOS (including subadditive, or arbitrary monotone) are "too hard", in the sense that Θ( √ m) is the best approximation achievable in poly-time even without concern for incentives, and this guarantee can be matched by VCG-based truthful mechanisms. Other valuation function classes like Gross Substitutes are "easy", in the sense that precise welfare maximization is achievable in poly-time, so the VCG mechanism is poly-time as well. Submodular valuations are a fascinating middle ground. Here, an algorithmic e/(e−1)-approximations is possible in poly-time (and it is NP-hard to do better) [Von08, MSV08, DV12a], but a long series of works establishes that it is NP-hard for a truthful mechanism to even achieve an m 1/2−ε -approximation (for any ε > 0) [PSS08, BDF + 10, BSS10, DSS15, Dob11, DV12b, DV12a, DV16]. On this front, our work establishes that significantly better (O((log log m) 3 )) guarantees are achievable with a slightly relaxed solution concept, matching the state-of-the-art in the communication model. In addition to the standalone motivation for the communication model discussed below, our work establishes that resolving key open questions (e.g. is there a constant-factor approximation in the communication model for submodular valuations?) may have strong implications in the computational model as well (via implementation in advised strategies).
Combinatorial Auctions in the Communication Model. In the communication model, only arbitrary monotone valuations are "too hard" per the above discussion: a 2-approximation is possible for subadditive valuations, and a On this front, our work in some sense unifies the state-of-the-art for submodular valuations in the communication and computational models via implementation in advised strategies. So in addition to the standalone interest in establishing (or disproving) a separation in the communication model, such a result will now likely have implications in the computational model as well.
Posted Price Mechanisms. Posted-price mechanisms are ubiquitous in mechanism design, owing to their simplicity and surprising ability to guarantee good approximations through a variety of lenses [KV12, DMSW15, FGL15, Dob16a, DFKL17, AS19]. Very recent work also establishes posted-price mechanisms as the unique class of mechanisms which is "strongly obviously strategyproof" [PT19] . One minor downside of these mechanisms is that they require buyers to compute NPhard demand queries. Our work formally mitigates this downside under implementation in advised strategies. For example, our work immediately extends the price of anarchy bounds of [DMSW15] to hold in equilibria which are poly-time learnable for submodular buyers (previously the equilibria required computation of demand queries).
Combinatorial Public Projects. Combinatorial Public Projects is a related problem, which has also received substantial attention. Here, the designer may select any set of k items, but every bidder receives all k items (instead of the bidders each receiving disjoint sets of items, as in auctions). We used the single submodular bidder Combinatorial Public Projects problem as a motivating example due to the hardness results established in [SS08] : no poly-time truthful mechanism can achieve an approximation ratio better than O( √ m) (unless P = NP). Contrast this with the general communication model, where Set-For-Free is truthful and precisely optimizes welfare. Follow up work of [Buc11] establishes that while the single-bidder CPPP is inapproximable only because demand queries are NP-hard, the strong multi-bidder inapproximability results of [PSS08, BSS10] hold even when bidders have access to demand oracles.
[KV12, Dob16a, AS19] already establish that computational separations for truthful and nontruthful combinatorial auctions disappear with demand oracles (so the story for combinatorial auctions differs greatly from combinatorial public projects). Our work further establishes that the same guarantees are achievable in truly polynomial time, under a relaxed solution concept.
(c, d)-Approximate Demand Oracles. To the best of our knowledge, bicriterion approximate demand oracles have not previously been considered. However, prior work regarding approximation algorithms for nonnegative submodular functions with bounded curvature subject to a matroid constraint designs a randomized (1 − 1/e, 1 − 1/e)-approximate demand oracle for submodular functions (under a different name) [SVW15, Fel19, HFWK19]. We include our ( 1 /2, 1 /2)-approximate demand oracles for submodular functions as they are deterministic and significantly simpler (note also that determinism makes our related solution concepts significantly cleaner).
Related Solution Concepts. The most related existing solution concept to ours is Algorithmic Implementation in Undominated Strategies [BLP09] . Here, a mechanism achieves an αapproximation if whenever players play any undominated strategy, the resulting allocation is an α-approximation (and for all dominated strategies, there is a poly-time algorithm to find an undominated one which dominates it). For posted-price mechanisms, this solution concept has no bite as the only undominated strategy is to pick the utility-maximizing set, and it is not possible to find this set in poly-time. We establish in Observation 2.8 that implementation in advised strategies is a relaxation of algorithmic implementation in undominated strategies. The purpose of our novel solution concept is to have bite even when it is NP-hard to find an undominated strategy.
Implementation in Advised Strategies
Motivated by the example of [SS08], we first relax the requirement that a mechanism be truthful, instead requiring that a mechanism achieve its approximation guarantee whenever players behave in a manner which is not clearly irrational. Before proposing our formal definition, let's examine it applied to two motivating examples.
Example One: [SS08] . There is a single buyer with submodular valuation function v(·). The seller's mechanism (Set-For-Free) allows the buyer to state any set of size k, and receive that set for free. Recall that it is NP-hard for the buyer to find their favorite set of size k -so if the mechanism is to be truthful, it is not poly-time (unless P = NP). The buyer can indeed find an e/(e − 1)-approximation in poly-time [NWF78] , but assuming the buyer will run this particular algorithm (or any specific approximation algorithm) is perhaps too strong an assumption.
Instead, we assume simply that the buyer picks a set yielding at least as much utility as this e/(e − 1)-approximation. Specifically, we will think of the designer as providing a poly-time mechanism (Set-For-Free -the buyer states a set of size k and receives that set for free), and a poly-time advice algorithm (takes as input the buyer's valuation function v(·), and a tentative set S, then runs the e/(e − 1)-approximation to get a set T and outputs arg max{v(S), v(T )}). Intuitively, we are claiming that it is certainly rational for the buyer to purchase a set other than T , but that it is irrational to purchase a set with v(S) < v(T ).
Example Two: Posted-Price Mechanisms. Consider now any posted-price mechanism. Again, we think of the designer as providing a poly-time mechanism (for all i, computes in poly-time a price vector to offer bidder i, based on interactions with bidders < i), along with a poly-time advice algorithm (takes as input the buyer's valuation function v(·), a tentative set S, computes in polytime a set T and outputs arg max{v(S) − p(S), v(T ) − p(T )}). Again note that we are claiming that it may be rational for the buyer to purchase a set other than T , but that it is irrational to purchase a set yielding lower utility than T .
Importantly, we emphasize that we assume the buyer achieves at least as much utility as recommended (a well-justified behavioral assumption, although not particularly convenient for welfare guarantees), and not that the buyer picks a set guaranteeing them at least as much welfare (more convenient for analyzing welfare guarantees, but an unmotivated assumption). With these instantiations in mind, we now build up language to present our formal definition.
Definition 2.1 (Mechanism as an Extended Form Game). Formally, a mechanism is just an extended form game: at every state, it solicits actions from one or more players and (possibly randomly) updates its state. With probability one, the mechanism eventually reaches a terminal state, and (possibly randomly) outputs an allocation of items and payments charged.
A mechanism is poly-time if every state update is poly-time computable, and the mechanism reaches a terminal state with probability one after poly(n, m) updates.
Definition 2.2 (Strategies, Utility, and Dominance). A strategy s(·) for player i is simply a mapping from the current state x of the mechanism to an action s(x).
We denote by u i (v i , s) the expected utility of player i when their valuation function is v i (·) and the players use strategy profile s.
, and there exists an
Advice is a function A(·, ·, ·) which takes as input the valuation v i (·) of a player, a state x of a mechanism, and a tentative action a, then (possibly randomly) outputs an advised action A(v i , x, a). We say that advice is poly-time if it is poly-time computable.
Observe that every advice A(·, ·, ·), valuation function v i (·), and tentative strategy s(·) induces a strategy
Definition 2.4 (Useful Advice). We say that advice A is useful if:
1. For all s(·), and all v i (·), either A v i ,s (·) = s(·), or A v i ,s (·) dominates s(·) (for valuation v i (·)).
For all s(·) and all
Advice is idempotent -applying advice to s(·) twice is the same as applying it once).
Intuitively, Property 1 guarantees that the bidder should indeed follow advice given by A instead of whatever strategy they had originally planned. Property 2 guarantees essentially that the bidder does not get "stuck" in an exponentially-long loop trying to repeatedly improve their strategy via advice (because the loop terminates after one iteration). Intuitively, useful advice A separates strategies into advised strategies (where A v i ,s (·) = s(·)), and ill-advised strategies (where A v i ,s (·) dominates s(·)). We say that a bidder follows advice if they use an advised strategy.
Definition 2.5 (Follows Advice). We say that s(·) is advised for v i (·) under A if A v i ,s (·) = s(·). A bidder with valuation v i (·) follows advice A if they use a strategy which is advised under A.
Intuitively, we are claiming that it is irrational for a player to use an ill-advised strategy s(·) (because they could instead use the strategy A v i ,s (·), which dominates it).
Definition 2.6 (Implementation in Advised Strategies). We say that a mechanism M guarantees an α-approximation in implementation in advised strategies with advice A if A is useful and for all v 1 (·), . . . , v n (·), if all players follow advice A, the resulting allocation in M achieves (expected) welfare at least α · OPT(v 1 , . . . , v n ). If both M and A are poly-time, we say that M guarantees a poly-time α-approximation in implementation in advised strategies (without referencing A).
Let's now briefly revisit our two examples through the formal definitions. First, recall the single-bidder mechanism Set-For-Free. Set-For-Free is poly-time: it takes as input a set and simply outputs that set, and terminates after one iteration. Consider the advice algorithm which takes as input v(·), and a set S, then runs the e/(e − 1)-approximation algorithm of [NWF78] to get a set T and outputs arg max{v(S), v(T )} (the mechanism has only a single non-terminal state, so this completely specifies the advice). Then the advice indeed recommends a dominating strategy whenever it recommends T = S, and is idempotent. Moreover, observe that the bidder follows advice if and only if they choose a higher value set than produced by the algorithm, and therefore we're guaranteed a e/(e − 1)-approximation whenever the bidder follows advice.
Posted-price mechanisms with poly-time computable prices are poly-time: they iteratively take as input a set from bidder i, assign that set to bidder i, then run a poly-time computation to determine the prices for bidder i + 1. They terminate after n iterations. We will later design poly-time approximate demand oracles, which take as input v i (·) and the price vector p, and output a recommended set D(v i , p) in poly-time. For a posted-price mechanism, there are multiple non-terminal states, each corresponding to a different price vector p. Our advice, on input v i , S, p, will advise the set arg max{v
it will output the better of the input set and the recommended set -this is clearly idempotent). If a strategy follows advice, it must,
). It's not immediately clear why this property should provide meaningful welfare guarantees, but we will later argue that the right pairing of mechanism and notion of approximate demand oracle achieves polynomial-time welfare guarantees which match state-of-the-art grantees for computationally-unbounded bidders.
Brief Discussion of Definitions. We chose our definitions with the goal of (a) providing a strict relaxation of truthfulness, and (b) doing so in a way that permits all rational behavior while (c) still eliminating enough irrational behavior to guarantee good welfare. We include in Appendix A a brief example motivating our decision to think of advice as improving a given strategy as opposed to outright proposing a replacement strategy. We conclude with the following sanity-check on our definitions, which formally establishes that implementation in advised strategies is a strict relaxation of truthfulness and algorithmic implementation in undominated strategies.
Observation 2.7. If player i with valuation v i has a dominant strategy s * (·) in mechanism M , and A v i ,s (·) := s * (·) for all s(·), then the only strategy which follows advice is s * (·) itself.
Observation 2.8. Let M achieve an α-approximation in algorithmic implementation in undominated strategies. Then M achieves an α-approximation in implementation in advised strategies.
Proof. Recall that algorithmic implementation in undominated strategies implies for all v i (·) the existence of a poly-time function f v i (·) which takes as input a strategy s(·) and outputs a new strategy
, and then A is useful and polytime. Moreover, the advised strategies are exactly the undominated strategies, so because M achieves an α-approximation whenever all players use undominated strategies, it also achieves an α-approximation whenever all players follow advice.
Of course, the whole point of our definitions is that the designer may not be able to find a dominant (or even undominated) strategy in poly-time, and implementation in advised strategies has bite even under these circumstances while the previous solution concepts do not.
Approximate demand oracles
In this section, we develop our poly-time advice for posted-price mechanisms in the form of an approximate demand oracle. Recall that a demand oracle for valuation function v(·) takes as input a price vector p and outputs a set in arg max S⊆M {v(S) − p(S)}. Recall also that implementing a demand oracle is NP-hard when v(·) is submodular. In fact, it is NP-hard to even guarantee better than a m-approximation when v(·) is submodular (more precisely, for any ε > 0 it is NP-hard to guarantee a set T satisfying
). Motivated by this, we pursue instead a bicriterion approximation. Specifically:
oracle takes as input a valuation function v(·) and a price vector p and outputs a set of items
That is, a (c, d)-demand oracle outputs a set guaranteeing at least an c-fraction of the optimal utility if all prices were blown up by a factor of 1/d. We refer to the utility of the optimal bundle with these higher prices (i.e. max T {v(T )−p(T )/d}) as the benchmark (so our goal is to be c-competitive with the benchmark). In this section, we establish that poly-time ( 1 /2, 1 /2)-approximate demand oracles exist for submodular functions, based on the simple greedy algorithm of [LLN01] .
⊲ If the marginal gain is at least twice the price S ← S ∪ {j} ⊲ Then allocate that item return S Proposition 3.2. When v(·) is submodular, SimpleGreedy is a ( 1 /2, 1 /2)-approximate demand oracle.
Proof. Our proof follows by induction on the number of items m. Importantly, observe that Sim-pleGreedy is recursive. Specifically, if we do not allocate item 1, then the remainder of the for loop is simply SimpleGreedy(v, p, M \ {1}). If we do allocate item 1, then the remainder of the for loop is simply SimpleGreedy
, this is the only part of the proof which requires submodularity instead of subadditivity). Now we begin with the base case. Observe that when m = 1, SimpleGreedy purchases the item if and only if the value exceeds twice the price. So when SimpleGreedy purchases the item, it is optimal. When SimpleGreedy doesn't purchase the item, the benchmark is 0 (because we compete with the optimal utility when the prices are doubled, which is zero). So in both cases, it guarantees a the required ( 1 /2, 1 /2)-approximation. This proves the base case. Now assume that the proposition holds for a fixed m ≥ 1, and consider the case with m + 1 items. First, observe that if SimpleGreedy does not allocate item 1, it is because v(1) < 2p(1).
By submodularity of v(·) (in fact, subadditivity suffices), this implies that v(S) − 2p(S) > v(S ∪ {1}) − 2p(S ∪ {1}) for all S ∋ 1 (and in particular, that the optimum when prices are doubled does not contain item 1). By the inductive hypothesis, SimpleGreedy finds a ( 1 /2, 1 /2)-approximation for v(·) on M \ {1}, which by the previous sentence is also a ( 1 /2, 1 /2)-approximation for v(·) on M , completing the inductive step in this case.
It remains to consider the case where SimpleGreedy allocates item 1. Let S 2 := S \ {1} denote the set output by SimpleGreedy(v {1} , p, M \ {1}), and let O * := arg max{v(Y ) − 2p(Y )} be the optimum bundle if prices were doubled. Then the inductive hypothesis guarantees:
Suppose first 1 ∈ O * . The inductive hypothesis then implies:
Above, the first and third lines are simply expanding the definition of v {1} (·), and the second line follows by inductive hypothesis. Observe that this concludes a ( 1 /2, 1 /2)-approximation in the case that 1 ∈ O * . Now, suppose instead that 1 / ∈ O * . Then we have:
Above, the first line follows by monotonicity and expanding the definition of v {1} (·). The second line follows by inductive hypothesis. The third line follows as v({1}) ≥ 2p(1) by assumption that SimpleGreedy allocates item 1. The final line follows again by expanding v {1} (·). This concludes both cases of the inductive step, and the proof of the proposition.
This concludes our development of bicriterion approximate demand oracles. The following section establishes that a wide class of posted-price mechanisms that achieve good guarantees when buyers use precise demand queries maintain their guarantees when buyers follow advice given by bicriterion approximate demand oracles.
Welfare Guarantees with Approximate Demand Oracles
In this section, we demonstrate that a slight modification of the O((log log m) 3 ) approximation of [AS19] (which is truthful when buyers implement precise demand oracles) maintains its approximation guarantee when buyers follow advice recommended by a ( 1 /2, 1 /2)-approximate demand oracle. We begin with the main insight below, followed by a precise statement of our main result.
Fixed Price Auctions with Approximate Demand Oracles
A key component of the [AS19] (and related) auctions is the notion of a Fixed Price Auction. A fixed price auction simply sets a price p(j) on item j, visits the buyers one at a time, and offers the buyer the option to purchase any set S of remaining items for price p(S) (so it is a posted-price mechanism which sets the same prices for all bidders).
A key lemma used in these works establishes that there exists a fixed price auction generating good welfare (when bidders implement exact demand oracles) for any instance with submodular bidders (or even XOS bidders). One can view the [Dob16a, AS19] auctions as attempting to learn such a "good" fixed price auction. The key intuition behind our extension is that good fixed price auctions still exist when bidders only implement approximate demand oracles. This is captured formally by Lemma 4.3 below, which first requires the notion of supporting prices.
Definition 4.1. q are supporting prices for v 1 (·), . . . , v n (·) and allocation S 1 , . . . , S n if: Much prior work leverages the fact that with precise demand queries, the fixed-price auction with prices q/2 achieves half the optimal welfare. The intuition for our main result is that this key lemma extends to (c, d)-approximate demand queries by losing an additional min{c, d} factor. In the statement below, we will slightly abuse notation and say that a bidder "follows advice given by a (c, d)-approximate demand oracle" if they follow advice given by an algorithm which on input v(·), S computs a (c, d)-approximate demand query T , then advises arg max{v
Lemma 4.3. Let q be supporting prices for v 1 (·), . . . , v n (·) and S 1 , . . . , S n . Then the fixed-price auction with prices dq/2 guarantees welfare at least min{c, d} · i v i (S i )/2 when all bidders follow advice given by a (c, d)-approximate demand oracle.
Proof. Let S := ∪ i S i . Let also T i denote the set purchased by bidder i (following advice given by a (c, d)-approximate demand oracle), and denote by Sold
Because items in A i are never allocated when bidder i is chosen to act (meaning that bidder i could choose to purchase the set A i ), and bidder i will choose a set guaranteeing at least as much utility as a (c, d)-approximate demand oracle, we have:
The welfare achieved ( i∈N v i (T i )) is exactly the sum of the utilities of each bidder (v i (T i ) − dq(T i )/2) and the total revenue of the auction ( i∈N dq(T i )/2 = dq(Sold)/2). By the definition of supporting prices (and the fact that
The first inequality follows as each bidder follows advice of a (c, d)-approximate demand oracle. The second follows as v i (A i ) ≥ q(A i ) for all i (by definition of supporting prices). The third follows as ∪ i A i = S \ Sold. The final inequality follows by basic arithmetic, and the final equality follows as q(S) = i v i (S i ) by definition of supporting prices. Lemma 4.3 captures the main intuition for why existing posted-price guarantees can be extended to accommodate bicriterion approximate demand queries. Of course, the [AS19] mechanism is not just a single posted-price mechanism, and Lemma 4.3 is just one technical lemma used along the way (to be more precise, a generalization of Lemma 4.3 is used along the way, but the overly technical statement hides the intuition). But an outline similar to the proof of Lemma 4.3 establishes the more general claim. Section 4.2 formally states our main result, and all details of the proof aside from the above intuition can be found in Appendix B. Theorem 1.1 now follows from Theorem 4.4 as submodular valuations are a subclass of XOS which admits poly-time ( 1 /2, 1 /2)-approximate demand oracles. The poly-time mechanism witnessing Theorem 4.4 is a slight modification of [AS19] . The high-level approach of their mechanism is the following: because V is XOS, Lemma 4.3 establishes that there exists a fixed-price mechanism which achieves an 1/O(min{c, d}) = O(max {1/c, 1/d}) approximation in implementation in advised strategies. Of course, implementing this fixed-price auction requires complete knowledge of v 1 (·), . . . , v n (·), which the seller lacks. The mechanism of [AS19] essentially tries to iteratively guess a better and better set of fixed prices, and then pick one uniformly at random.
Formal Statement of Main Result
Intuitively, our adapted [AS19] mechanism works with (c, d)-approximated demand oracles for the same reason that Lemma 4.3 works with approximate demand oracles. Formally establishing this requires a bit of work, but much of the analysis of [AS19] treats the (c, d) = (1, 1) case of Lemma 4.3 as a black box, and therefore we can leverage most of their analysis as a black box as well. The generalized Lemma 4.3 (Lemma B.2) provides all the properties of demand queries which their proof requires (and all the properties of approximate demand queries which our adaptation requires). A complete proof appears in Appendix B.
Approximate Demand Queries beyond Submodular
In this section, we explore approximate demand queries beyond submodular valuation functions. As the approximation guarantees of [AS19] hold for XOS valuations with precise demand queries, a poly-time (Ω(1), Ω(1))-approximate demand query would immediately extend their guarantees to XOS valuations under implementation in advised strategies. Interestingly, this very fact establishes that for all ε > 0, no poly-time (Ω(m −1/2+ε ), Ω(m −1/2+ε ))-approximate demand oracle exists for XOS valuations using subexponentially-many value queries.
Proposition 5.1. For all ε > 0, there is no (Ω(m −1/2+ε , Ω(m −1/2+ε ))-approximate demand oracle for XOS valuations using poly(m) value queries.
Proof. Assume for contradiction that the proposition were false. Then by Theorem 4.4, there exists an algorithm using poly(n, m) value queries that approximates the optimal welfare within O m 1/2−ε · (log log m) 3 ∈ O(m 1/2−ε/2 ) for XOS valuations. However, Theorem 6.1 of [DNS10] proves that no such algorithm exists.
To complete the picture, we also design poly-time (Ω(1/ √ m), Ω(1/ √ m))-approximate demand oracles for subadditive valuations (defined immediately below, based on the Ω(1/ √ m)-approximation of [DNS10]), which is the best possible using subexponentially-many value queries.
√ m )-approximate demand oracle for subadditive valuation functions.
Proof. Let S be the set that maximizes utility (v(S) − (1 + √ m) · p(S)). If S = ∅, then the benchmark is 0, and SingleOrBundle achieves non-negative utility. It remains to consider the case v(S) − p(S) > 0.
In this case, let T be the set returned by SingleOrBundle(v, p, M ). Call an item j special if:
Observe that if any item j is special, then we conclude:
. Summing this for all j ∈ M * yields:
The final inequality follows as S cannot contain items for which v(j) < (1 + √ m)p(j), as v(·) is subadditive. We can then conclude that:
The first inequality follows directly from (1). The second follows as v(j) > (1 + √ m)p(j) for all j ∈ M * , and S ⊆ M * (because v(·) is subadditive, and S is the utility-maximizing set at prices (1 + √ m)p). The third follows from subadditivity of v(·). We conclude that when there are no special items, the proposition is satisfied as well, completing the proof.
[DNS10] 
A Brief Discussion of Definitions
The following example will motivate our decision to think of advice as improving a given strategy as opposed to outright proposing a replacement strategy. Consider, for example, a single-bidder mechanism where the bidder faces one of k posted-price vectors p 1 , . . . , p k chosen uniformly at random, and is asked to submit their desired sets S 1 , . . . , S k before knowing which price is "real." Then the strategy which submits S i := arg max{v(S)−p i (S)} is dominant. In this case, advice could indeed simply propose this strategy to replace whatever else the bidder might try.
Things get more interesting, however, if the designer cannot recommend a dominant strategy. Consider instead a recommended strategy T 1 , . . . , T k where T i / ∈ arg max{v(S) − p i (S)} ∪ arg min{v(S) − p i (S)} for any i (call this strategy T ). If the designer shares the sets T 1 , . . . , T k with the buyer, a reasonable buyer should certainly submit sets S i satisfying v(S i ) − p i (S i ) ≥ v(T i ) − p i (T i ) for all i (because they could just swap any set violating this for T i and strictly improve their utility). Consider then the strategy which sets S j ∈ arg max{v(S) − p j (S)} (for a single j ∈ [k]) and S i ∈ arg min{v(S)−p i (S)} for all i = j (picks the optimal set for p j , and worst possible sets for all other p i , call this strategy S). We don't want to say that a bidder originally planning to use S should instead use T (indeed, T does not dominate S, and it's not a priori clear which strategy yields higher expected utility). But we do want to say that a bidder originally planning to use S should stick with S j , and update S i to T i for all i = j. But in order to recommend such a strategy without knowing j in advance, T would need to be the dominant strategy itself. So in order for the solution concept to meaningfully apply to posted-price mechanisms without advising the dominant strategy itself, advice should really take the form of improving a tentative strategy rather than outright recommending a replacement. Lemma B.11 below provides a representative example of how this solution concept can be harnessed for existing state-of-the-art mechanisms.
B Proof of Theorem 4.4
The full definition of "implementation in advised strategies" is very powerful, but a bit awkward to carry around. Throughout this appendix, we use the following definition of (c, d)-competitive sets, which simply says that a set of items will give the bidder utility at least as high as a (c, d)approximate demand oracle.
We say a bidder i picks (c, d) competitive sets in a fixed price auction if, when the fixed price auction visits i, they pick a set which is a (c, d)-competitive subset of the collection of remaining items.
The full proof of theorem 4.4 is fairly involved. We start off this section by providing the more technical version of lemma 4.3 in section B.1, which captures most of the properties of fixed price auctions with approximate demand queries which we need. Next in section B.2, we describe the "core algorithm" PriceLearningMechanism of [AS19] . Then in section B.3, using fairly elementary properties of fixed-price auctions, we prove the correctness of the PriceLearningMechanism, as long as 1) bidders pick (c, d)-competitive sets in every fixed price auction they participate in, and 2) we make the simplifying assumption B.3. In section B.4, we remove the simplifying assumption, and prove that there exists poly time computable advice such that, when bidders are following the advice, they always pick (c, d)-competitive sets.
B.1 Generalization of Lemma 4.3
In this subsection we state and prove the generalization of Lemma 4.3, which will be used in the analysis of the PriceLearningMechanism.
The first term in the maximum below (and the "moreover" part of the lemma) relates the achieved welfare with the value of the unsold items, and will be used to handle "learning" phases in the mechanism. The second term of the maximum shows that once we have learned the prices well, we definitely get good welfare. N, dp) , where each bidder i picks a subset of the remaining items which is (c, d)-competitive set for v i with prices p. Let {O i } i∈N be any allocation with supporting prices q. Let S i be the set of items j where δq(j) ≤ p(j) ≤ 1 2 q(j) and j ∈ O i . Denote S = i∈N S i and Sold = i T i . Then
Moreover, suppose k is the last bidder in N . We also
Because items in A i are never allocated when bidder i is chosen to act (and because each bidder picks a (c, d)-competitive set with prices p), the utility of each bidder i satisfies
, and by the definition of supporting prices, we know that q(
Observe that S \ Sold = i∈N A i . Thus, ignoring the term dδq(Sold) from (*), we can conclude the auction gets welfare at least c 2 q(S \ Sold). Moreover, (*) tells us we get welfare at least
from which we can conclude main statement of the lemma. For the "moreover" component, simply observe that when bidder k was picked by the mechanism, the items in A ′ := S k \ Sold <k were still available, and that
B.2 The Mechanism
For the reader's convenience, we first briefly describe the mechanism in [AS19] and quote the mechanism verbatim (the only change we need to make is that every price used by the mechanism is "discounted" by an extra factor of d, plus some slight simplifications in the "removing extra assumptions" step). Then we present a slightly condensed version of the analysis.
High-level overview Posted price mechanisms for combinatorial auctions typically use the following high-level strategy: attempt to (approximately) learn the supporting prices (definition 4.1) of an optimal allocation, then sell the items at those prices. The key innovation of [AS19] is to "explore" prices for each item individually using a price tree in which each successive layer of the tree corresponds to a finer "granularity" of prices. Initially, each item is set at a price corresponding to the root of the tree, and in each successive round of the mechanism, the price of each item moves one layer down in the tree to a "more precise" price which corresponds to some child node of the old price. The mechanism of [AS19] runs several fixed-price auctions for each round (i.e. each layer of the price tree). In each of these successive auctions, each item is priced higher and higher in a way corresponding to the children of the "old" price node of the item. The price in the next round of the mechanism is then the highest price in the next layer where the item was still sold. The idea here is that, in the next layer of prices, we need to make the prices as high as possible such that the items will still sell. Intuitively, this serves to refine our estimate for the supporting prices as we move a layer down in the tree.
In fact, the story is more subtle than this. The mechanism may not actually achieve a better approximation to the prices in each layer, but [AS19] prove that if you do not get a better estimate for the prices, then you can already get a good approximation to the optimal welfare at the current prices. These two cases exactly correspond to the "learnable" or "allocatable" cases in lemma B.4 below. For this reason, for every layer of the price tree, the mechanism has some chance (proportional to the number of layers) of stopping early and allocating the items according to some fixed price auction in that layer. Thus, regardless of whether we always learn prices or if we hit the "allocatable" in some step, we will use a good auction with some probability.
Simplifying Assumption It's useful for posted price mechanisms to know ahead of time the range of possible supporting prices of an optimal allocation. This assumption can be removed in a fairly "modular" way, as done in [AS19] (though we make some modifications in order to more easily fit our solution concept). Figure 2 ] An illustration of a price tree T e with α = 2, β = 3, and ψ min = 1.
Let q be the supporting prices of an optimal allocation. Formally, our simplifying assumption is the following: Assumption B.3. There are known numbers ψ min , ψ max such that the supporting prices of any item in q are either 0 or in [ψ min , ψ max ], and ψ max /ψ min is polynomial in m.
The price tree and mechanism parameters We now formally describe the price tree in terms of three parameters:
• α = Θ(1) is the branching factor of the tree (and the number of auctions in each iteration of the mechanism).
• β = Θ(log log(ψ max /ψ min )) = Θ(log log m) is the number of layers in the price tree (and the number of iterations of the mechanism).
• γ = Θ(αβ) = Θ(log log m) is the "accuracy factor" of the prices.
We would like the leaves of the price tree correspond to "price buckets"
for some k large enough that all prices in [ψ min , ψ max ] are considered. Informally, we take "learning a price q correctly" to mean that we find the bucket in P to which q belongs. We will assign "actual" prices in p according to the smallest price ψ min γ i in the corresponding bucket. Our goal is that, if we "learn the price of q correctly", then the price used in p is within a γ factor of the true price in q. However, for technical reasons, we need a gap of at least γ between the prices of consecutive nodes in each layer of the tree (not just the leaves), so that prices will be guided to the closest leaf node below the price in q (this is desirable because lemma B.2 requires prices in p to be less than in q). To ensure this, the mechanism creates a price gap of factor γ between nodes by splitting P into
Trees T o and T e are constructed with leaf nodes P o and P e respectively. We use T * to denote either of T o or T e , and P * will denote the corresponding P o or P e . The price tree T * is an α-branching tree with depth β (i.e. with β + 1 layers). The leaf nodes correspond, in left-to-right (depth-first search) order, to the price buckets in P * (in increasing order). Furthermore, any non-leaf node x corresponding to a single price, which is the minimum value in any bucket of any leaf node which is a descendant of x. Thus, the prices corresponding to consecutive level-i nodes differ by a factor of γ 2α β+1−i .
Let p be a "level-i price vector", i.e. a vector in which the price of each item is a price which corresponds to some level-i node. We let next (i) j (p) = p ′ denote the price vector constructed as follows: for each item ℓ ∈ M , let x be the level-i node whose corresponding price is p(ℓ). Then set p ′ (ℓ) to the price corresponding to the jth child node of x. Thus, a precise formula is given by p ′ (ℓ) = γ 2α β−i (j−1) p(ℓ). In words, next (i) j (p) sets the price of each item ℓ to be the jth largest "refined price" below the current price of item ℓ.
The mechanism We start by randomly picking a price tree T o or T e . The mechanism then proceeds in β iterations (though it may terminate early) in which a price vector p (i) is constructed in each iteration i. Initially, p (1) is the (unique) level-1 price vector of T * . In each iteration, a 1 10β fraction of the bidders are selected uniformly at random, and the α different price vectors p (i) j = next (i) j (p (i) ) for j = 1, . . . , α are considered. The mechanism runs fixed price auction with the current set of bidders on prices dp (i) j /2 for j = 1, . . . , α. The new (level-(i + 1)) vector p (i+1) is then constructed as follows: for each item ℓ, p (i+1) (ℓ) = p (i) j (ℓ), where j is the highest index such that item ℓ sold in the auction with prices dp (i) j /2. (or p (i) (ℓ) if no such j exists). In words, the new price of ℓ is the price of ℓ in the highest auction in iteration i for which item ℓ was sold. For each fixed price auction described in this paragraph, there is a 1/Ω(αβ) chance that the mechanism will terminate early and return the allocation determined by the auction. This serves to strictly incentivizes bidder to pick good sets, but also serves an important purpose for achieving the desired approximation grantee, as discussed in the overview.
If the mechanism does not terminate early in iteration 1, . . . , β, then the final step of the mechanism is to run a fixed price auction with all of the remaining bidders on prices dp (β) /2. (The hope is that, for a large fraction (weighted by q) of the items, the price of the items is in the level-β bin which is closest to the price in q, and thus we can apply lemma B.2.)
The exact mechanism in [AS19] is quoted in Algorithm 3.
B.3 The Modified Analysis
Notation. We follow [AS19] and depart somewhat from conventional notation for the analysis of the mechanism. We let i denote an iteration of the mechanism, j denote an auction inside some iterations, b denote a bidder, and ℓ denote an item.
Let O be an optimal allocation with supporting prices q and OP T be the optimal welfare resulting from allocation O. Let q * be q restricted to items whose prices are in some bucket of P * . Let O * be the collection of those items. Let N 1 , . . . , N β+1 denote the groups of bidders from the Partition function. Given (N i ) i and T * as picked by the mechanism, define price vectors q (i) as q * , restricted to items which are allocated in O * to bidders from N i , N i+1 , . . . , N β+1 (intuitively, we restricted attention to items which could still go to the same bidder in A as in O, and give price 0 to items that can no longer be allocated to the right bidder in O). Call item ℓ correctly priced at iteration i if q (i) (ℓ) is in the bin corresponding to some leaf node which is a child of the node Permute N uniformly at random.
3:
for i = 1, 2, ..β do
4:
Remove |N | 10β bidders uniformly at random from N ; assign them to the set N i .
5:
Put the remaining items in N into N β+1 .
6: procedure PriceUpdate(A 1 ,. . . ,A α , p 1 ,. . . ,p α )
7:
For each ℓ ∈ M , let p ′ (ℓ) = p j (ℓ) for the 8:
highest value of j such that ℓ is allocated in A j (or p 1 (ℓ) if no j exists)
9:
Return p ′ 10: Let (N 1 , N 2 , ...N β+1 ) ← Partition(N ) 11: Pick one of the modified trees T o or T e uniformly at random and denote it by T * 12: Let p (1) be the (unqiue) level-1 (root) price of T * 13: for i = 1, . . . , β do 14:
For j = 1, . . . , α, let p
15:
For j = 1, . . . , α: run FixedPriceAuction(N i , M, dp 
α ), and continue 18: Run FixedPriceAuction(N β+1 , M, dp (β+1) /2) and return the allocation A * corresponding to p (i) (ℓ). Let C (i) denote all items priced correctly before iteration i begins. Note that C (1) = O * and that an item can only be in C (i) if it is also in C (j) for j = 1, . . . , i − 1, so
j is the subset of items in C (i) that are priced correctly in next Assumptions. Throughout the claims in this section, we assume all bidders pick (c, d)-competitive sets in every fixed price auction they participate in, though we may not restate this assumption in every claim statement 5 . We also assume that the optimal allocation O has supporting prices q.
The following lemma is the heart of the proof of the approximation ratio of mechanism 3. For the reader's convenience, we highlight the differences between our proof and the proof in [AS19] in blue. 
First we prove a series of claims before proving the Learnable-Or-Allocable lemma, following the same outline as [AS19] . For claims B.5 and B.6, we fix some j ∈ [α] and let D = C
, as q (i) zeros out items allocated in O to bidders from N <i .
Proof. Recall that O D N i is the restriction of O * to items in C (i) j and bidders in N i . The definition of item ℓ being "priced correctly" means that p (i) (ℓ) ≤ q (i) (ℓ). Thus, for any ℓ ∈ O D N i we get that 0 · q (i) (ℓ) ≤ dp (i) (ℓ)/2 ≤ q (i) (ℓ)/2. Thus, the claim follows from lemma B.2.
Claim B.6. (5.4 from [AS19] ) By randomness of choice of N i from N ≥i , E val(A
Proof. Consider picking a bidder k ∈ N >i uniformly at random and running an imaginary fixed price auction on N i ∪{k}, where k is the last bidder chosen to act. Then by Lemma B.2 (parameters in the lemma take values
, the value bidder k gets from the imaginary fixed price auction satisfy
. We now take the expectation over the randomness on bidders N i ∪ k,
Observe that the expectation of val(A (i) j ) is the same as the expected welfare of bidders in N i in the imaginary fixed price auction. Since the bidders in N i arrive before bidder k, their expected welfare in the imaginary fixed price auction is larger equal to that of bidder k. Thus by linearity of expectation
Claim B.7. (5.2 from [AS19] ) For any j, we have
Proof. By combining Claim B.5 and B.6, we have
j . Thus, we get
The previous claim can be thought of as a preliminary version of the entire learnable-orallocatable lemma. In expectation, we get something comparable to the items which are correctly priced in auction j of round i (i.e. q (i) (C (i) j )). The contribution come from either the items which sold in the round they were "supposed to" (i.e. C (i) j ∩ A (i) j ) or the welfare of the current allocation (i.e. A (i) j ) (with an extra O(β) factor). The previous claims dealt with individual auctions within an iteration -next we handle iterations as a whole.
We still have to account for two things: items which sell in auctions where the prices are too high and the loss in welfare from the fact that bidders in N i will no longer be allocated items in later rounds. The proofs in [AS19] hold as written -only the properties of the price tree and the structure of the auctions are used.
Claim B.8. (5.5 from [AS19] )
Proof. The key observation here is that the set of "overpriced" items represent a small fraction of the optimal revenue. Let U be the set of items that are allocated in FixedPriceAuction with price above their correct price in round i. The set of items that are allocated in the correct round but not priced correctly is exactly
. This must be a subset of U . Thus,
. Consider an allocation that gives all items in U to the bidder in the highest priced auction where it is ever allocated. Such an allocation must give welfare ≤ OP T , but ≥ γq (i) (U ) due to the price gap in the tree structure. Thus
Proof. This follows simply from the fact that q (i+1) is exactly q (i) with items corresponding (under O) to bidders in N i set to zero, and that bidders join N i with probability 1/(10β). 
We now have two cases. First, assume
Together with (2) this immediately implies that
and we are in the "learnable case". On the other hand, if equation (3) is false, then we can sum the inequality in claim B.7 for each j = 1, . . . , α to get
· OP T. and we are in the "allocatable" case. Proof. Note that by the Learnable or Allocable Lemma, in the mechanism there are only two situation that can occur, 1) event E 1 : "learnable" occurs in every iteration i = 1, 2, ...β, or 2) event E 2 : "allocable" occurs in some iteration k. Denote the welfare from the mechanism as W elf . Then E [W elf ] satisfy the equation
• Suppose that "learnable" occurs for each iteration i = 1, 2, ...β in the mechanism. Because C (1) consist of items whose prices belong to the bins of P * , we know that E q (1) (C (1) ) = OP T /2. Thus,
Let W β+1 be the welfare achieved when the mechanism allocate in the last iteration of fixed price auction. Since for any correctly priced item j ∈ C (β+1) ,
It's easy to verify that the mechanism allocates in last iteration with constant probability. Thus, in this case we get E [W elf |E 1 ] at least O min c, d β · OP T .
Proof. As in prior works [AS19, Dob07, Dob16a], to formally meet our solution concept we need all actions by a single bidder to happen simultaneously in order to preclude bidders from "threatening" each other (for example, if a different bidder will only let me have items in future auctions if I lie in the current auction, then truthful play does not dominate lying). Thus, we formally implement GeneralizedMechanism as a game where each bidder can act in exactly one node. If the bidder is assigned in N stat , the mechanisms simultaneously asks all bidders in N stat for a single bid on the grand bundle. If the bidder is put in N mech , and then into N i for i < β + 1, then the bidder needs to participate in α fixed-price auctions simultaneously in a single game node. Thus, the bidder reports a list (T j ) j=1,...,α of α subsets of M , where T j is still available in auction j of the mechanism when it is bidder i's turn to pick a set. Bidders in N β+1 report similarly, but participate in only one auction.
Recall that the advice function A(v i , x, a) takes as input the valuation function v i of player i, a node x of the game, and a "tentative" action a which the player may play. The advice works as follows: for a node x which corresponds to a bidder in N stat , A can ignore the tentative action a and recommend truthful play in the second price auction, i.e. A(v i , x, a) = v i (M ) in this case. If x corresponds to a bidder put in N i ⊆ N mech for some i < β, then the tentative action a is some list of sets (S 1 , . . . , S α ) which bidder i may choose in each auction. For each of the α auctions, A will run the (c, d)-approximate demand query D (with prices and remaining items known from the node x) to get a sets T 1 , . . . , T α . Then, A will return (S ′ 1 , . . . , S ′ α ), where S ′ i is whichever of S i or T i that gives bidder i higher utility. The advice behaves similarly for bidders in N β+1 ⊆ N mech .
It's clear that, if D is computable in poly-time, then A(v i , x, a) is computable in poly-time. We now show that A is useful (definition 2.4). A satisfies the required idempotency property, because for bidders in N stat , the result of A is a constant, and for bidders in N mech , the result is given by taking the max of sets S j with the result of D (which is fixed given bidder's valuation v i and a node x of the game).
For any s i and for any randomness in the mechanism, it's clear that A v i ,s gets i utility at least as high as s. For, if i is in N stat , then A v i ,s recommends a dominant strategy, and if i is in N mech , then the utility of i is completely determined by the unique node in which i is chosen to act, and A v i ,s will differ from s only in selecting sets with higher utility for i. Moreover, if s = A v i ,s , then either s and A v i ,s differ for some node corresponding to a bidder in N stat , or s and A v i ,s differ for some node corresponding to a bidder in N mech . In the first case, because A v i ,s is dominant, there exists v −i and random outcomes of the mechanism which get i strictly higher utility. In the second case, there must be some auction in which the advice A v i ,s selects strictly better sets than s, and because there is positive probability that each auction is the allocation returned by the mechanism, there are some random outcomes of the mechanism which get the bidder strictly more utility. Thus,
Finally, it's clear that if a bidder plays according to strategy A v i ,s for any s, then if the bidder is in N stat then they play truthfully, and if the bidder is in N mech then they select (c, d)-competitive sets. Now, we show that algorithm 4 successfully allows us to remove assumption B.3. Let S be any set of bidders and let OP T (S) denote the optimal welfare possible for bidders in S. We say (ψ min , ψ max ) is correct for S if ψ min ≤ OP T (S)/m 2 and ψ max ≥ OP T (S). We call a bidder i dominant for a set S if v i (O i ) > OP T (S) 8 . Lemma B.12. Let q be the supporting prices of an optimal allocation of items to bidders in some set S. If (ψ min , ψ max ) is correct for S, then the supporting prices of a (1 − o(1)) fraction of the items (weighted by their supporting prices) are in the range I = [ψ min , ψ max ]. More formally,
Proof. Since ψ max ≥ OP T (S), we know that for all item j, q(j) ∈ [0, ψ max ]. Now we count the sum over supporting prices of items whose supporting price is ≤ OP T (S)/m 2 .
Corollary B.13. For bidders in S and items in M , if (ψ min , ψ max ) is correct for S, and ψ max /ψ min = poly(m), then PriceLearningMechanism(S, M ) returns an allocation with expected welfare 1
Proof. Again let q be the supporting prices of an optimal allocation of items to bidders in some set S. Observe that although Theorem B.10 assumes all supporting price to be in 0 ∪ [ψ min , ψ max ], the proof holds as is for approximating j∈[m] ½ q(j) ∈ [ψ min , ψ max ] · q(j) (i.e. the contribution to the optimal welfare of items whose supporting price is in [ψ min , ψ max ]). If (ψ min , ψ max ) is correct for S, then
We conclude that PriceLearningMechanism returns an allocation with expected welfare
The following lemma follows from a standard application of chernoff bound and is quoted verbatim from [AS19] . It allows us to show that, with constant probability, a good fraction of the welfare is achievable by bidders in both N stat and N mech . 
Finally, once the previous lemma has been applied, we will need this lemma to prove that we set the parameters correctly for PriceLearningMechanism.
Lemma B.15. If N stat satisfy OP T (N stat ) ≥ 1 4 · OP T and OP T (N mech ) ≥ 1 4 · OP T , then (ψ min , ψ max ) is correct for N mech .
Proof. Assume N stat satisfy OP T (N stat ) ≥ 1 4 · OP T and OP T (N mech ) ≥ 1 4 · OP T . We know that SP A < OP T (N stat ). Thus
. Moreover, since SP A is at least the value of M for any bidder in N stat , we have m · SP A ≥ OP T (N stat ). Thus ψ max = 4m · SP A ≥ 4 · OP T (N stat ) ≥ OP T ≥ OP T (N mech ).
We conclude that (ψ min , ψ max ) is correct for N mech .
Theorem B.16. For valuation functions v 1 , . . . , v n , suppose the optimal allocation O has supporting prices q. Let D be a (c, d)-approximate demand oracle for valuation in {v 1 , . . . , v n }. Then mechanism 4 with advice A as in lemma B.11 gets a O max 1 c , 1 d · (log log m) 3 fraction of the optimal welfare in implementation in advised strategies.
Together with the fact that every allocation for XOS valuation functions has supporting prices, we immediately get theorem 4.4.
Theorem 4.4. Let V be a subclass of XOS valuations and let D be a poly-time (c, d)-approximate demand oracle for valuation class V. Then there exists a poly-time mechanism for welfare maximization when all valuations are in V with approximation guarantee O max 1 c , 1 d · (log log m) 3 in implementation in advised strategies with polynomial time computable advice.
C Approximate Demand Queries vs. Approximate Welfare Approximation
As it happens, both SimpleGreedy and SingleOrBundle were inspired by simple known algorithms for approximate welfare maximization, combined with the following simple observation:
Proposition C.1. S is the return of a demand query on prices p if and only if (S, M \ S) is a welfare maximizing bundle for the following two player auction: one bidder has valuation function v, and the other bidder has additive valuation function given by p.
Proof. The utility of v is v(S) − p(S), which differs from the welfare v(S) + p(M \ S) only by the constant p(M ). So maximizing these two objectives is equivalent.
In particular, SimpleGreedy is exactly the 2-approximation algorithm from [LLN01] played by a regular bidder and a "price bidder". SingleOrBundle is similarly inspired by the √ m approximation of [DNS10]. However, we show below that approximate demand queries do not, in general, reduce to approximate welfare maximization. However, consider running an approximate welfare maximization mechanism A with two bidders: one with valuation v(S) for bundle S and one with valuation p(S) for bundle S. The optimal allocation is to give any S of size exactly √ m to v, and give the rest of the items to p. This has welfare m + √ m. However, the allocation giving every item to p has welfare m. Thus, any constant factor approximation algorithm (for which no other grantees hold) may return this allocation, as m + √ m = (1 + o(1))m.
This corresponds to an approximate demand query giving the bidder the empty set. As this has zero utility, it will fail to be any factor approximation ration of the optimal. Moreover, the above example would still go through if we consider a few simple variations on the reduction given by Proposition C.1. For example, if we discount prices by a constant factor, say d, it's still the case that d(m − √ m) + 2 √ m = (1 + o(1))dm, so a constant-factor approximation algorithm A might give all items to the "price player". Thus, approximate demand queries do not reduce to approximate welfare maximization (at least not as outlined by Proposition C.1).
D Other Algorithms for approximate demand oracles
Here we give another algorithm for computing a (1/2, 1/2)-approximate demand oracle. Instead of being inspired by known welfare maximization algorithms, this technique is inspired by known submodular maximization algorithms. Namely, the algorithm MeetInMiddle below is exactly the algorithm DeterministicUSM from [BFNS15] , run on the submodular function f given by f (S) = v(S)− p(S). When f is a nonnegative (possibly decreasing) submodular function, [BFNS15] shows that it gives a 1/3 approximation to the maximum value of f . Unfortunately, the submodular utility function we are interested in is possibly negative, so this result does not apply (indeed, it is NP hard to achieve any nontrivial approximation ration for possibly negative submodular maximization, as we discussed in section 3).
Algorithm 5 MeetInMiddle(v, p, M ) X ← ∅ and Y ← M for j = 1, . . . , m do ⊲ For items in an arbitrary order Set
For SimpleGreedy and SingleOrBundle, we needed to run an existing algorithm with the "higher" prices p/d to attain a (c, d)-approximate demand oracle for (i.e. a set S for which v(S) − p(S) ≥ c max T v(T ) − p(T )/d). Interestingly, we show that MeetInMiddle need to take the lower ("discounted") prices as input in order to provide an approximation guarantee.
We show that 1. For any ǫ > 0, S =MeetInMiddle(v, p, M ) is not a (ǫ, ǫ) approximate demand oracle for prices ǫp (i.e. there exists a valuation function v such that v(S) − ǫp(S) < max T {v(T ) − p(T )}).
2. MeetInMiddle(v, p/2, M ) is an ( 1 2 , 1 2 ) approximate demand oracle for prices p/2 (i.e. for any submodular v we have v(S) − p(S)/2 ≥ 1 2 max T {v(T ) − p(T )}).
Example D.1. For any ǫ > 0, let K = 4/ǫ and N = 2 + (K − 1)/ǫ and M = {1, 2, ...N }. Consider the price vector p(1) = K 2 + 1 and ∀i > 1 : p(i) = 1 − ǫ and the bidder valuation function v(S) = K for any S ∋ 1 and v(S) = 1 + (|S| − 1)ǫ for any S ∋ 1. One can check that the valuation function is submodular.
MeetInMiddle will remove the first item from X, since v(M − 1) − v(M ) + p(1) = K 2 + 1 > 
Where the first inequality follows from the definition of O ′ 2 , and the second follows from the inductive hypothesis combined with ( §).
